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Yes, Jurors Have a Right to Freedom of Speech Too! ...
Well, Maybe.
Juror Misconduct and Social Networks
Porsha M. Robinson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution guarantees, among other freedoms, the
freedom of speech by stating that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech."' The First Amendment's plain
meaning suggests that Congress cannot place a restraint upon or
censure citizens' expressions of opinions and facts. For years,
lawmakers and academics have explored this First Amendment
guarantee, balancing state and individual interests, creating
categories, establishing restrictions, indicating limitations and
exceptions, making distinctions, and molding this First Amendment
right into its current form.2 Today, the First Amendment is
generally construed to protect free speech and free press, although
"certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" may
be limited or even punished. But, as with many rights and theories,
innovation can cause new and unanswered questions to surface.
*Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2014.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of
Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN L.
REv. 719 (1975); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First
Amendment Jurisprudence 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2353 (2000); Frederick Schauner,
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1765 (2004).
3. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) ("These
[classes of punishable or preventable speech] include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.") (citation omitted).
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The implications arising from the increased use of technology have
created grey areas in First Amendment law.4
One such grey area is a juror's right to free speech during a
trial. Many scholars have acknowledged that the use of social
networking by jurors impacts an accused person's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.' The main focus of the
commentary has been on the risks to a fair trial that communication
through social media poses and ways to mitigate that risk.
However, few commentators have considered the weight of that
Sixth Amendment right in relation to jurors' First Amendment
rights. When this Sixth Amendment right is balanced with the
juror's First Amendment right to post what he or she pleases under
the right of "freedom of speech," tension arises. Furthering the
problem, there seems to be no consistency in protocol among states
to combat the use of social media during trials in regards to what
jurors are allowed to post and the consequences jurors face when
they over-step those boundaries. Even with the increasing number
of technological advances, jurors should still have a First
Amendment right to freedom of speech during trials.7 To address
this issue, courts need to create an efficient method of handling
misconduct because of social media usage by juries. Taking these
issues into consideration, this Note acknowledges the importance of
ensuring that a defendant is afforded his or her Sixth Amendment
rights, but argues for the importance of preserving jurors' First
Amendment rights as well by converging the interests and purposes
4. See generally Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First
Amendment: Breaking the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 247 (1994); Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free
Speech at-and Beyond- Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1543 (2010).
5. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The
Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322 (2005); Hon. Amy J. St. Eve
& Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social
Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 1 (2012).
6. Id.
7. See Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 389,
390, 406 (1994) (arguing in favor of juror speech because it "serves several
critically important functions in society - functions protected under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution").
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that underlie both the First and Sixth Amendments to achieve an
approach that aligns them.
Part II of this Note explores the meaning and origins of the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. It describes what
constitutes an impartial juror, the types of misconduct often
encountered by courts today, and how courts analyze such claims.
Part III looks at the First Amendment rights of jurors, examining
how courts view juror speech in general and standards that can be
applied by courts with regards to juror speech via social media. Part
IV examines the use of social media by jurors, the impact of such
usage on a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, and approaches
courts have taken in attempting to remedy the situation. Part V
gives examples of methods designed to address social-media-related
juror misconduct, and analyzes the benefits and consequences of
implementing such methods. Part VI acknowledges the importance
of considering jurors' First Amendment rights when implementing
a strategy to address this issue. It also lays out the important aspects
that need to be included in such an approach, as well as a
suggestion for the type of reform that would be most efficient in
combating the problem that the use of social media by juries has
created.
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
A. The Meaning of an Impartial Jury
Impartial: "Unable to perceive any promise of personal advantage
from espousing either side of a controversy."8
In order to efficiently determine what constitutes juror
misconduct, it is important to figure out what exactly courts are
trying to protect in regards to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
8. DIANA DELL, MEMORABLE QUOTATIONS: HUMORISTS, WITS, AND
SATIRISTS OF THE PAST 28 (2000) (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S
DICTIONARY (1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to an impartial jury.9 Though the concept of what it means to be
"impartial" may, in itself, seem simple, in reality, the concept is very
confusing.
The Sixth Amendment states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense. 0
This is a defendant's constitutional right, in a criminal prosecution,
to have a trial by an impartial jury."
The origins of what constitutes an impartial jury can be
traced back to United States v. Burr.1 The case explains the
importance and value of an impartial jury." Aaron Burr, Vice
President to Thomas Jefferson, was prosecuted for treason.1 His
attorney argued that Burr was denied a fair trial because the public
had already been filled with belief of his guilt through different
9. Strauss, supra note 7, at 395 (discussing the conflict between the First
and Sixth Amendments in regard to juror journalism).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. 25 F. Cas. 49 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, D. Va. 1807).
13. Id. at 50 ("The real reason of the rule is, that the law suspects the
relative of partiality; suspects his mind to be under a bias, which will prevent
his fairly hearing and fairly deciding on the testimony which may be offered to
him. The end to be obtained is an impartial jury; to secure this end, a man is
prohibited from serving on it whose connexion [sic] with a party is such as to
induce a suspicion of partiality. The relationship may be remote; the person
may never have seen the party; he may declare that he feels no prejudice in
the case; and yet the law cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the jury
because it suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a similar situation
would feel prejudice.").
14. Id. at 52.
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media, which would make it difficult to find impartial jurors. 5 Chief
Justice Marshall explained that:
[tlhe great value of the trial by jury certainly
consists in its fairness and impartiality. Those
who most prize the institution, prize it because
it furnishes a tribunal which may be expected to
be uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind. I
have always conceived, and still conceive, an
impartial jury as required by the common law,
and as secured by the constitution, must be
composed of men who will fairly hear the
testimony which may be offered to them, and
bring in their verdict according to that
testimony, and according to the law arising on
it.
Chief Justice Marshall depicted the impartial jury as an integral
part of the judicial system, and thus a juror's ability to render a fair
verdict based only on the evidence presented at trial is required by
law.'7 He explained further that in order to be impartial, it is
necessary for a jury to "enter upon the trial with minds open," and
let the evidence presented at trial be what enables them to make a
decision and not "preconceived opinions."' 8 Chief Justice Marshall
concluded by providing a standard for determining whether a juror
is partial or not.'9 He stated that "light impressions" on the juror,
which still allow for an open mind, are not sufficient to object to a
partial juror.2 0 Rather, what is objectionable are the "strong and
deep impressions" that close the juror's minds to anything offered
at trial.21 He stated that:
those who try the impartiality of a juror ought .
. . to hear the statement made by himself or
given by others, and conscientiously determine,
15. Id. at 49.
16. Id. at 50.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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according to their best judgment, whether in
general men under such circumstances ought to
be considered as capable of hearing fairly, and
of deciding impartially, on the testimon[sic]
which may be offered to them, or as possessing
minds in a situation to struggle against the
conviction which that testimony might be
calculated to produce.22
The Burr Court made a determination about whether jurors who
had prejudged the defendant's guilt could serve as a juror and held
that people are not permitted to serve on a jury when they have
such an impression of the case that they would not be able to
maintain an open mind.2 3 It is possible to extract a standard from
this case that can be applied broadly: people who are not able to
maintain an open-mind and make a decision based solely on the
evidence presented at trial are not considered impartial and should
24not be able to serve as a juror for that trial.
Later, in Irvin v. Dowd,25 the Supreme Court addressed, in a
habeas corpus proceeding, whether the murder conviction and
26death sentence of the defendant-petitioner was valid. The
defendant-petitioner was prosecuted for six murders in a case that
27was highly publicized. There were also press releases that stated
that the defendant-petitioner had confessed to the crimes.2 8 The
argument on appeal was whether such widespread publicity had a
prejudicial effect that disabled jurors from being able to decide
defendant's guilt or innocence impartially.29 The Court
acknowledged that impartiality is a "state of mind," not a "technical
conception," and that the Constitution does not have a specific test
22. Id.
23. Id. at 52.
24. Id. at 52.
25. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
26. Id. at 718.
27. Id. 719.
28. Id. at 719-20.
29. Id.
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or procedure to determine whether a juror is impartial.30 The Court
went on to say that in order to ensure a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury, "[i]t is sufficient if [ ] juror[s]
can lay aside [their] impression[s] or opinion[s] and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court."0' This standard,
however, has been difficult to apply 32 because unless manifested
though a juror's overt acts, it is nearly impossible to determine
whether a juror has "closed his mind" against the testimony and
evidence given at trial.
B. Typical Forms of Juror Misconduct and How Courts Handle
Such Misconduct
Even in light of the complexity of defining impartiality,
there are categories of misconduct that are quite common in cases
throughout the United States. These categories include: "juror
discussion of the case before deliberations;" 34 "unauthorized juror
visits to the crime scene or other investigation conducted by
jurors;"3 "experiments by jurors;"36 "juror exposure to pretrial
30. Id. at 724-25 (quoting United States v. Wood, 229 U.S. 123, 145-46
(1936)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 723 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 724.
33. Id. at 722 n.3.
34. 3 Mark J. Kadish & Rhonda A. Brofman, Criminal Law Advocacy §
55.02 (Matthew Bender ed. 2012).
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Gershman, supra Note 5, at 332 ("Examples of improper
juror experimentation include a juror who placed a heavy load in the trunk of
his car as a conscious way to determine whether such weight in a trunk would
have imparted knowledge to the defendant of the presence of drugs, a juror's
experiment in attempting to fire a weapon while holding it in a position
consistent with the defendant's account, clocking how long it would take to
drive a certain distance, and simulating a witness's use of binoculars to
determine whether the witness could possibly have seen what he claimed he
saw. The same principle that forbids jurors from acquiring specialized
knowledge through extra-judicial means also accounts for the prohibition
against jurors making unauthorized visits to locations described in the trial
testimony.").
5992013]
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publicity during trial;"" "introduction of facts not in evidence to the
jury;"" "unauthorized material or extraneous information in the
jury room;"3 "improper juror contacts with third persons;"40 "juror
intoxication or other juror incapacity;" 4' and "juror bias."42 Though
this is not a complete list of what has been found to constitute
misconduct, these are generally the most common forms of juror
misconduct.43
Curtailing juror misconduct in trials is so important because
it prevents the jury from forming preconceptions of guilt and
ensures the use of only admitted evidence. It is important that the
evidence used by the jury in determining the outcome of a case
comes from "a public courtroom where there is full judicial
protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-
examination, and of counsel."" By discussing the case and utilizing
certain methods of research and communication, a juror may
discover the guilt of the defendant, a prior criminal record or
misconduct, or even a reputation that the defendant has among
peers.45 The discovery of this type of information can lead to a
verdict that is unfavorable to the defendant because it tends to
"impair the value of collective decision-making, lack the context of
the court's legal instructions, prejudice a defendant who may not





42. This includes both latent and patent bias. Gershman, supra note 5, at
349 ("Courts generally reject claims of implied bias. However, courts have
recognized that in some instances jurors may be exposed to such highly
inflammatory circumstances that presuming the existence of a bias is
reasonable. Such imputed bias has been shown when jurors have learned of
the defendant's guilt in an earlier trial on the same charges, have been
exposed to extremely prejudicial pre-trial publicity, have been exposed to
highly prejudicial events during the trial, have a very close relationship with
one of the important actors in the case, were a victim of the crime and are
emotionally involved in the case, and gave dishonest answers on the voir dire
to get on the jury.").
43. Kadish and Brofman, supra Note 34, at §55.02.
44. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965).
45. Gershman, supra note 5, at 328.
600 [Vol. 11I
have had the opportunity to present evidence, and benefit the
prosecution by reducing the burden of proof."4
Because of the potential improper verdicts, courts are given
"considerable discretion in determining whether an investigation
into alleged juror misconduct is warranted and how the
investigation will be conducted." 7 Determining whether a juror is
guilty of misconduct is often quite a feat for courts because they
must make the determination "guided by the content of the
allegations, including the seriousness and likelihood of the alleged
bias, and the credibility of the source." 4 8
Regardless of who raises the issue of misconduct, there
generally must be "substantial evidence" to warrant an
investigation into the claim of misconduct.49 If a juror is found to
have engaged in impropriety, the movant has the initial burden of
producing evidence to substantiate the claim.o Remmer v. United
States,5' provides a helpful standard in holding that:
any private communication, contact, or
tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror
during a trial about the matter pending before
the jury is . . . deemed presumptively
prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known
rules of the court and the instructions and
directions of the court made during the trial,
with full knowledge of the parties.
This presumption then shifts the burden to the non-moving party to
prove that "there exists no 'reasonable possibility that the jury's
46. Id. at 341.
47. Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First
Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and its Effect on the America
Courtroom, 30 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 301, 304 (2010).
48. United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 1983).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1537 n.9
(4th Cir. 1986) ("Courts have generally applied the presumption of prejudice
automatically after there has been an unauthorized communication to the
jury.").
51. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
52. Id. at 229.
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verdict was influenced by an improper communication.'" 3 When a
claim of wrongdoing arises, many courts will take into consideration
not only if there is a possibility of harm, but also whether there was
actual harm because of such alleged misconduct.5 4
Once a proper motion for misconduct is made, the options
for a judge to examine the potential and actual harm include:
[D]eny the objection and proceed with the trial;
[ ] give a curative instruction, designed to
remove any possible taint from the jury's
collective mind, and proceed with the trial; []
hold an in camera hearing and order a new trial
if it finds misconduct so prejudicial as to deny
the defendant a fair trial; [] determine the
existence of prejudicial misconduct without an
in camera hearing and order a new trial; [or]
dismiss or replace the offending juror if the
misconduct only affects one or two jurors and
occurs prior to the start of deliberations.5
Once misconduct is found, the judge can take various remedial
measures to rectify juror impropriety." Of the various remedies,
mistrials are the most extreme given the wasted resources, energy,
and effort.
The reason why discovering juror misconduct is so
important seems relatively clear: courts want to ensure that juries
reach a fair verdict, based solely on the information given during
trial. 8 Understanding this exact objective is necessary to balancing
the First and Sixth Amendment rights relevant here. Knowing the
importance of the right to an impartial jury enables courts to tailor
a solution to juror misconduct that meets the goal of a fair trial
53. United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Stephens v. S. At. Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1988)).
54. Kadish and Brofman, supra Note 34, at §55.02.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. McGee, supra note 47, at 306-07.
58. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). See also United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, D. Va. 1807).
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under the Sixth Amendment without completely denying the
speech rights of jurors guaranteed by the First Amendment.
III. JUROR MISCONDUCT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF JURORS
A. The Importance of furor Speech
As with other types of speech, there is value in juror
speech.s9 For example, juror speech allows insight into some aspects
of the judicial system and allows jurors to explain and give opinions
on what they may view as flaws in the systemi 0 Listening to what
jurors have to say can also reveal insight to the inner workings of
the judicial system, which, if it suggests that justice has been served,
can help to instill faith in the institution itself.6' Revealing how legal
decisions are reached and whether or not they were made fairly and
legally may also help to preserve the integrity of the system.6 2 Juror
speech can also provide the public with essential information about
the duty of the jury. Experience seems to be the best teacher, and
so others may learn through the experiences of those who have
served as a juror.64 Thus, any standard that is applied to juror
speech needs to take the value of such speech into consideration.
Concern about juror speech, however, is not a new issue.
Jurors' First Amendment rights and the impact of exercising those
rights on the fairness of a trial on which jurors serve can be traced
back to the concern over jury journalism, where jury members
attempt to profit by giving their account of what happened during a
66trial. The concern over juror journalism is that jurors will be
59. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 406-09 (discussing the value of freedom
of expression in the context of juror journalism).




64. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 406-08.
65. See id. at 389.
66. Id.
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motivated by the potential profit they may gain, and in turn would
be incapable of rendering a fair and unbiased verdict.67
Juror journalism began to become popular in the 1990s in
the wake of several high profile cases, most notably with the
murder trial of O.J. Simpson, and jurors have since sold their
stories to newspapers and even written books about their
experiences of serving on a jury.69 For example, when juror
journalism was on the rise, a juror in the trial of Bernard Goetz
(accused of shooting several people who tried to mug him in a
subway in New York) recorded his daily impressions of the case on
a tape recorder to keep track of them.70 He kept this record because
he "had a reasonable belief that it might be worth something."7 ' He
ended up selling his story to the New York Post for close to
$5,000.72 In 2009, jurors who sat on the trial of Scott Peterson
(convicted for the murder of his wife and unborn son) wrote a book
about their experiences serving on the trial entitled We, The Jury.
More recently, after the trial of officers Kenneth Moreno and
Franklin Mata (who were acquitted of rape), a juror serving on the
trial published an e-book, entitled Confessions of a Rape Cop Juror,
67. Id. at 393. See also Gershman, supra note 5, at 345-46 (discussing
high profile cases including: Martha Stewart trial where the juror gave several
media interviews after the conviction and was accused by Stewart's lawyers of
misconduct by lying to get on the jury; Texas murder trial of millionaire
Robert Durst where a juror appeared on television to promote her book, in
which she describes her experience on the jury (this occurrence acquitted Mr.
Durst); Tyco trial, where a juror "visibly appear[ed] throughout the trial to
favor the defendants, suggesting that she deliberately sought to become a
member of the jury for questionable motives"; also alleged in the trial of Scott
Peterson, his lawyers contended that at least three "stealth jurors" lied to get
on the jury in order to convict Peterson).
68. Id. at 391-93, 91 n.11.
69. Strauss, supra note 7, at 391-95.
70. See id. at 392; see also Michael Freitag, In the Right Case, Jury Duty
Can Pay, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/22/
weekinreview/in-the-right-case-jury-duty-can-pay.html.
71. Strauss, supra note 7, at 392 (quoting Freitag, supra note 70).
72. Id.
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that chronicled the jury's process of reaching the controversial and
unpopular verdict.74
Sometimes when juror journalism occurs, attorneys attempt
to have the judge declare a mistrial, claiming that the juror's desire
to sell their story tainted the trial." One example of this was in State
v. Smart," where the defense attorney in a trial in which a woman
was charged with inducing her teenage lover to kill her husband
claimed that a juror was documenting her recollections of the trial
via audiotapes.7 ' The attorney claimed that the juror tried to sell the
materials to the defense and was hoping to sell them to a
publisher." The court denied the motion for a mistrial, finding that
there was no evidence to prove that the juror intended to sell the
tapes during her service as a juror. 9 When juror journalism was first
a growing concern, there were no hard-and-fast standards under
which to analyze whether a restriction of a juror's speech was
constitutional.o There are now arguments, however, for different
standards that should apply to juror speech, but there does not
appear to be a consensus on which to apply."
B. Two Possible Standards to Apply to Juror Speech
One argument is that strict scrutiny should apply when
analyzing a restriction on juror speech." This argument finds its
74. Exclusive: Inside NYPD 'Rape Cops' Jury Room, CBS LOCAL (Sept.
19, 2011, 11:59 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/09/19/exclusive-inside-
nypd-rape-cops-jury-room/.
75. Strauss, supra note 7, at 393-94.
76. 622 A.2d 1197 (N.H. 1993).
77. Id. at 1200, 1210-11.
78. Id. at 1211.
79. Id.
80. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 409-15 (exploring two seemingly
different standards of regulating juror speech).
81. See id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: Protecting
Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 862-67 (1998)
(making the argument that attorney speech about cases and the judicial
process should be viewed as political speech, which would be protected by the
First Amendment).
82. Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 862-67.
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basis in comparing juror speech to that of political speech -speech
that is about the government and government officials. The
Supreme Court has continually described a "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."8" In order to restrict such
political speech, the restrictions must pass strict scrutiny." Under
the strict scrutiny standard, a regulation will only be upheld if it
serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.86
The argument is that since courts are a part of the judicial
branch of government, anything that is involved in the judicial
process should be considered government action. If court
proceedings are considered to be government actions,88 then "[a]ny
speech about a judge or a judge's rulings" should be governed by a
strict scrutiny standard.89 Under a strict scrutiny standard, the
government has the burden of proving that the action was
"necessary to achieve a compelling purpose" and that the action is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.90 One problem with this
standard, however, is that it may only protect speech related to the
court system itself and officers in the their official capacity.9' As the
Court speaks of "debate on public issues," there is a question as to
83. Id.
84. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _, (2011), 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215
(2011).
85. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 863.
86. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198.
87. Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 863.
88. Id. at 863 ("It is not just the actions of the judge in court that
constitute government action; in holding that the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges by attorneys representing private parties in civil cases
and even criminal defense attorneys are impermissible, the Court made it
clear that court proceedings are government actions.") (citations omitted). See
also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1992) (citations omitted);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
89. Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 863.
90. Id. at 881.
91. See id. at 863-64.
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whether jurors' discussion of pending cases rise to the level of
political speech to warrant strict scrutiny review.9
There is, however, another argument that the First
Amendment rights of jurors are analogous to the First Amendment
rights of attorneys during the trial.93 So long as a juror is sitting on
the jury, he or she is an officer of the court, just like an attorney is
an officer of the court.9 Some argue that officers of the court
should receive less free speech protection because "officers of the
court have a fiduciary responsibility not to prejudice fair trials
because they have special access to information and a professional
responsibility not to thwart a fair judicial process."95
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,96 Chief Justice William
Rehnquist stated that "[t]he State has a substantial interest in
preventing officers of the court, such as lawyers, from imposing
such costs [(referring to the adverse effects of pretrial publicity)] on
the judicial system and on the litigants."97 In that case, Dominic
Gentile, a criminal defense attorney, gave a press conference in
which he made remarks "that the State sought the indictment and
conviction of an innocent man as a 'scapegoat' and had not 'been
honest enough to indict the people who did it; the police
department, crooked cops."'98 The State Bar of Nevada brought a
disciplinary action against Gentile, alleging that he violated
Nevada's code of professional responsibility." The Court
92. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. - (2011), 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
93. Strauss, supra note 7, at 412-16 (reviewing the Gentile v. State Bar of
Nev. standard as it applies to speech after the trial was already over in the
context of juror journalism and acknowledging that the problem with that
analysis is that jury members are officers of the court only during the trial;
once the trial is over, so is their duty, and thus, it is unclear whether this
standard would still apply post-trial).
94. Id.
95. Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 871-72 (discussing Mark R. Stabile,
Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Case,
789 GEO. L.J. 337 (1990)).
96. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
97. Id. at 1075.
9& Id. at 1034.
99. Id. at 1033.
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recognized that attorney speech about pending cases is protected by
the First Amendment, but held that if such speech poses a
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory
proceeding," then it can be regulated.1 0 The Court stated: "Because
lawyers have special access to information through discovery and
client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat
to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers' statements
are likely to be received as especially authoritative.,"'0 ' The Court
then concluded: "We agree with the majority of the States that the
'substantial likelihood of material prejudice' standard constitutes a
constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment
rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's interest in fair
trials."'0
Keeping this assertion in mind, the argument that jurors and
attorneys should be subject to the same standard of review in
regards to restriction on speech seems rational.0 3 Though
statements from jurors may not be received as authoritative, jurors
still, through the impartiality requirement, have a civic duty that
can be likened to a "fiduciary responsibility not to prejudice fair
trials" and a "responsibility not to thwart a fair judicial process."1 0
Thus, if jurors are viewed as analogous to officers of the court
because they serve a vital function in the effectiveness of the
judicial process during criminal trials, their speech about pending
cases would be held to the "'substantial likelihood of material
prejudice' standard."05
100. Id. at 1075; Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 875 (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.6(a)).
101. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 1075.
103. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 414.
104. See Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 871-72 (referencing Mark R.
Stabile, Free Press-Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized
Case, 789 GEO. L.J. 337 (1990)); supra Section II.A. (describing the meaning
of impartiality).
105. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 414-15 (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at
1071 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
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IV. SOCIAL MEDIA AND JURIES
The use of the Internet has increased tremendously over the
past two decades. Along with this surge in usage is the increase in
utilization of social media.'" Today, people use social media as a
constant means of communication, which includes: simply catching
up with family and friends, networking for jobs, sharing views on
current events, reading about what is happening around the world,
entertaining themselves, blogging, sharing photos, and much
more.0o While social networking sites have been around since the
late 1990s, they have gained more popularity in recent years."
Whether viewed as a beneficial phenomenon or a hindrance, the
existence of social networks implicates various areas of the law,
including an integral part of the judicial system -the jury.'0o
Social networking allows individuals to express themselves
by various means. For many, logging into social networking services
like Facebook or Twitter has become a daily routine, causing them
to post and interact through these sites without thought."o Since the
jury mostly consists of lay people, the likelihood that a majority of
the people sitting on a jury utilize social media is significantly
high."' As the usage of social media by jury members increases, so
does the chance that they may mention something about the trial
with which they are involved.112 The amount that a juror posts on a
106. See Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:
Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED
COMMC'N 210, 214-18 (2007) (analyzing the rise of social media).
107. See generally id. (noting the ways people use social media).
108. See id. at 214-18.
109. See generally David P. Goldstein, The Appearance of Impropriety
and Jurors on Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with
Juror Misconduct, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 589, 594 (2011); Kathleen Elliott
Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just
"Face" It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355 (2010) (addressing jurors and social media).
110. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: Juror
Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 422 (2012).
111. See id.
112. See John G. Browning, When All That Twitters is Not Told: Dangers
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social networking site on a regular day may indicate how much a
juror posts during trial because a person may be unlikely to change
their habits simply because they are serving as a juror."' For
example, if a person is accustomed to updating his or her Twitter
followers almost every five minutes about the most insignificant
details of their lives, it may be hard for that same person to not
inadvertantly post details about the trial for which they are on the
jury.H4 The modern usage of social media by the average person can
thus create problems when the average person becomes a juror.
A. Extent of Social Media Use & Its Potential Impact on the
Impartiality of Juries
Communication between jurors about subjects that do not
relate to the trial is generally considered acceptable conduct; the
problem arises when the juror communicates about what is
happening in the trial on which the juror is currently sitting."' Juror
disclosure of happenings during trial is not a new occurrence."
Social media is just another avenue for jurors to discuss the events
of a case,"' and despite disapproval, it is a constant occurrence."
Thus, the rise of social media has caused an increase in juror
misconduct."'
113. Vinson, supra note 109, at 402.
114. See id.
115. Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 425.
116. See Goldstein, supra note 109, at 594-95 (discussing how in the past
jurors have discussed cases with outsiders that include: government officials
who are not a part of the case, strangers (especially those who happen to be in
and around the courthouse), and members of the press).
117. Id.
118. See Robert P. MacKenzie III & C. Clayton Bromberg Jr., Jury
Misconduct: What Happens Behind Closed Doors, 62 ALA. L. REv. 623, 638
(2011) ("The fastest developing area in the realm of juror misconduct involves
juror use of e-mail, social networking sites such as Facebook, and micro-
blogging sites such as Twitter during trial."); Douglas L. Keene & Rita R.
Handrich, Online and Wired for Justice: Why Jurors Turn to the Internet, THE
JURY EXPERT, Nov. 1, 2009, at 15-16, available at
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/KeeneTJENov2009
.pdf.
119. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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Reuters Legal, a division of Thomson Reuters Corporation
that provides legal news from around the country, conducted a
three-week study in late 2010 where it searched for tweets on
Twitter that included the terms "jury duty." 20 The search revealed
that a tweet referencing jury duty was made almost once every
three minutes from prospective or sitting jurors.121 Many of the
tweets expressed complaints about having to serve as a juror or how
bored they were, but a significant number of tweets were in regards
122to their perception of the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Twitter is just one of many social networks.123 With the
growing number of social networks, one can only imagine how
much information jurors actually post about the trial for which they
124are serving through all of the different networks. As jurors
continue to utilize social networks during trials, many are
concerned that these actions are jeopardizing the fairness of these
trials.1 25 The use of social media begins to create impartiality
because it allows jurors to be influenced by outside forces and
126obtain access to outside information. The content of a juror's
social media activities may also prove an actual, existing bias.127
Prohibiting juror communication about the trial is
important to maintaining juror impartiality.2 8 Such prohibitions are
120. Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track,






124. Barry P. Goldberg & Melissa Cassel, Jury Trials in the Age of Social
Media, JD SUPRA LAW NEWS (October 22, 2012),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/j ury-trials-in-the-age-of-social-media-
19221.
125. Kathy Lynn Gray & John Futty, Judges Fear Social Media




127. Cf id. (noting that a juror tweeted "Report from jury duty:
defendant looks like a murderer. GUILTY. Waiting for opening remarks.").
128. Goldstein, supra note 109, at 589.
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intended to enable jurors to remain impartial during deliberation,
and allow them to render a verdict free of undue influences. 129
When a juror violates his oath3 o and partakes in conduct that
impacts his ability to be impartial and unbiased, it constitutes jury
misconduct. 13 Jurors who post details of a trial can infringe on a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.132 So, courts limit
communications because they want to ensure jury impartiality.
Two of the main ways that social media usage can impact juror
impartiality is by allowing the juror access to information that was
129. Id.
130. When jurors are sworn in, they take an oath that they will give a
true verdict based on the evidence. Sometimes jury instructions refer to this
oath. For example, the Tenth Circuit's Civil Pattern Jury Instructions state:
You, as jurors, are the judges of the facts. But in
determining what actually happened-that is, in reaching
your decision as to the facts-it is your sworn duty to
follow all of the rules of law as I explain them to you. You
have no right to disregard or give special attention to any
one instruction, or to question the wisdom or correctness
of any rule I may state to you. You must not substitute or
follow your own notion or opinion as to what the law is or
ought to be. It is your duty to apply the law as I explain it
to you, regardless of the consequences. However, you
should not read into these instructions, or anything else I
may have said or done, any suggestion as to what your
verdict should be. That is entirely up to you. It is also your
duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence,
without prejudice or sympathy. That was the promise you
made and the oath you took.
CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITFEE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (2011), available at
http://www.calO.uscourts.gov/downloads/pjilO-cir-crim.pdf.
131. Gershman, supra note 5, at 324.
132. See Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, Are Tweeters or
Googlers in Your Jury Box?, 46 ARIz. Ar'Y 38, 39-40 (Feb. 2010), available
at http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/201002/?pg=41#pg5.
133. See generally id. at 324-44 (addressing the various ways courts limit
jurors' communication); see also Goldstein, supra note 109, at 599.
JURIES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
not available during trial and by enabling bias against those
involved in the case.m34
1. Social Media As A Means of Finding Information
Many of the traditional juror misconduct cases occur
because jurors perform outside research about the current case. 3 5
Such gathering of information includes researching: jury
instructions, definitions of legal jargon, substantive law, and how
courts have ruled in other cases.' More problematic is the ability
to look up information on the parties in a case- the defendant,
witnesses, and even judges and attorneys. A simple search on
Google is enough to produce information, but social networks can
be used similarly, sometimes providing much more information. 3 1
By searching a person's name and viewing their profile, on a social
network site, one can learn a great deal about that person.139 For
example, in a case involving the sexual abuse of two teenage girls,
jurors independently viewed one of the alleged victims' MySpace
profiles." 0 Although nothing relevant was revealed through viewing
the profiles,141 it is not difficult to imagine how the situation could
have turned out differently. If, for example, the jurors found
information that led them to believe that the victims were
promiscuous, such information may have impacted the verdict in
the case. Even if this type of information were not admitted during
trial because it violates evidentiary rules, the juror would have
134. See generally Gershman, supra note 5 (addressing how jurors' use of
social media can lead to acquisition of information outside of the trial and how
their communications of their opinions evidences possible biases); Goldstein,
supra note 109 (addressing jurors' use of social media, their acquisition of
information outside of the trial, and their disclosure of personal biases).
135. See generally Daniel William Bell, Note, Juror Misconduct and the
Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81 (2010) (discussing how the Internet impacts the
problem of jurors conducting outside research while sitting on a trial).
136. Id.
137. See Browning, supra note 112, 217-19.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 217.
141. See id.
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found the information for himself. This would be the type of
situation that courts intend to prevent-jurors being impacted by
outside influences, which in turn affects their ability to be impartial.
In addition to information about the parties involved in the
case, jurors can also use the Internet to find superfluous technical
information that will allow them to answer a determinative
question in the case.142 Although the Sixth Amendment applies to
criminal cases,'14 it is helpful to view how jurors utilize social media
during their time as jurors in civil cases as well. For example, in a
wrongful death action in Kentucky, there was a claim that the
defendant, a police officer, shocked the deceased with a Taser,
which in turn caused his death.144 The estate of the decedent filed a
motion to have the verdict set aside, alleging that two jurors
"consulted Taser International's website[,] and used information
from the site to persuade other jurors that Tasers are non-lethal,"
causing the jury to exonerate the police officer.14 5 The city of
Louisville, Kentucky ultimately paid $150,000 to settle the claims.'46
A juror in a criminal case can use social networks in a
similar manner by just logging on and directly messaging one of
their online friends and asking them for, what the juror may believe
to be, their expert opinion on an issue. 14 For example, if a juror did
not believe that a certain object could actually be used to murder
someone and asked a friend for his "expert opinion," that juror may
have extra, and possibly incorrect, information concerning
something that was not presented at trial. Having this extraneous
information or viewpoint could prejudice the defendant because
142. See Bell, supra note 135, at 85-86.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions.....)
(emphasis added).
144. See Andrew Wolfson, Taser Death Verdict Challenged Over Juror's
Conduct, LOUISvILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 2010, available at 2010
WLNR 795830.
145. Browning, supra note 112, at 218; see also Wolfson, supra note 144.
146. See Andrew Wolfson, Louisville Pays Family $150,000 in Death of
Tasered Man, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 9, 2010.
147. See Bell, supra note 135, at 83-86.
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jurors are required to base their verdict on the evidence that is
presented and vetted at trial, not outside information.'48
2. Social Media As a Means of Forming a Bias
Social networks can also be used to "appeal to the masses"
about a case on which the juror is sitting.149 For example, a juror in
England, on a child kidnapping and sexual assault case, posted a
message on Facebook that discussed specifics of the case and asked
friends what their views were on how the case should be decided; in
essence surveying what the defendant's fate should be.'50 The juror
was dismissed once the court discovered this activity."' Though this
is not an American case, it illustrates just how a juror can use
Facebook or any other social network to form an opinion before
even hearing all of the evidence offered at trial.152
Imagine being a juror and deciding to post on a social
network that you got called for jury duty for a case that involves
substantial media attention and that evokes the morals or emotions
of most of your friends. All of a sudden, your post has generated
hundreds of comments on how the defendant is a remorseless
malefactor and that he deserves to be punished. Even if most of
these accusations are unfounded based on the evidence at trial, if
you are the type of person who easily submits to the demands and
wishes of others, you may vote in a manner that is acceptable in the
eyes of your social media friends even if that outcome is contrary to
the weight of the evidence.' Posts like this can lead a juror to
148. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
149. See John G. Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror: A World Wired
for Instant Information Can Create Problems in Court, D MAG. LEGAL
DIRECTORY 2010 (May 12, 2010), http://www.dmagazine.com/Home/
DMagazine/2010/LegalDirectory_2010/Dangers ofjthe OnlineJuror.aspx.
150. Marcy Zora, Note, The Real Social Network: How Jurors' Use of
Social Media and Smart Phones Affects a Defendant's Sixth Amendment
Rights, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 588 (2012).
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[A]
juror who comments about a case on the Internet or social media may
engender responses that include extraneous information about the case, or
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reach a conclusion that is not based on the evidence introduced.
Since the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to an "impartial
jury,"15 4 if a post impacts a juror's decision or impartiality, then it
violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right."s Instead of a jury
of twelve peers, the defendant could now have a jury of potentially
thousands of a juror's closest "friends" who are conducting a
completely different type of deliberation via social media.5 6
There can be a variety of other reasons for juror misconduct
concerning online communication.'" Some jurors may feel as if
important information was withheld and that such information is
necessary for them to find in order to return the correct verdict. 8
Other jurors may not completely understand what exactly they are
not allowed to discuss and with whom they are not to discuss such
things.'"9 Some jurors may not see a problem with posting
information about the case on social networks at all.'" Yet other
jurors may just disregard the court's instructions and feel the need
to discuss the case to seek popular opinion, instill awareness, or
simply boast that the life of another is in their hands. Whatever the
reason, jurors continue to communicate via social media, sometimes
at the cost of tainting a trial. To be sure, the popularity of social
161networks has influenced juror behavior, for better or worse.
attempts to exercise persuasion and influence. If anything, the risk of such
prejudicial communication may be greater when a juror comments on a blog
or social media website than when she has a discussion about the case in
person, given that the universe of individuals who are able to see and respond
to a comment on Facebook or a blog is significantly larger.").
154. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
155. See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305.
156. See id.
157. See Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 433-36 (discussing the reasons
for improper juror communication).
158. See Zora, supra note 150, at 585.
159. See Greene & Spaeth, supra note 132, at 39 ("It seems, however,
that many jurors do not see blogging, tweeting or posting as communication,
or at least they don't consider it to fall within the rubric of traditional
admonitions.").
160. See Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 433-34 (discussing the reasons
for improper juror communication).
161. See id. at 435.
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B. The Impact on Legal Proceedings Because of Different
Court Approaches to Handling Social Media-Related Juror
Misconduct
1. Overturning Verdicts and Declaring Mistrials
Though most jurors may not have been purposely trying to
reach these results, posts on social networks have resulted in
verdicts being overturned and cases being reversed and remanded
based on juror online conduct. 6 2 For example, in December 2011,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas overturned the murder conviction
of a death row inmate because a juror tweeted during the
proceedings.'
In Dimas-Martinez v. State,6" the defendant had been
convicted and put on death row for holding a seventeen-year old at
gunpoint, robbing him, and then shooting him.s6 5 During the
proceedings, a juror tweeted: "Choices to be made. Hearts to be
broken. We each define the great line."'66 When asked about the
tweet, the juror responded that it did not pertain to just the case,
but to "future stuff" as well.16' He also added that "Define the
162. See Greene & Spaeth, supra note 132, at 39. See also Nicole B.
Casarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews and the Jury System,
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 499, (2003) (discusing jurors disclosing
information to the press). The same reasons that jurors communicate with the
press may relate to why jurors post on social networks. This includes:
"providing a peek behind closed doors," "expressing emotions relating to jury
service," "conveying the difficulty or ease of decision-making," "admitting
doubts, mistakes, misconduct," "appraising the lawyer, judges or justice
system," "endorsing or defending their decision," and "divulging the votes,
remarks, or opinions of others." See id. at 520-46.
163. Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 257 (Ark. 2011). Another
juror fell asleep during trial, which also contributed to the juror misconduct
that led to the court's decision to remand for a new trial. See id. at 245; Jeannie
Nuss, Death Row Inmate Gets New Trial After Juror Tweet, USA TODAY, Dec.
9, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-12-08/juror-
tweet-death-row/51741370/1.
164. 385 S.W.3d 238, 257 (Ark. 2011).
165. Id. at 240-42.
166. Id. at 246.
167. Id.
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Great Line" was an album by the band Underoath. 6 ' The Supreme
Court of Arkansas stated that even more troubling about this
juror's tweeting was that after being asked about it, he continued to
tweet during the trial.'69 Before the jury announced its verdict, he
tweeted: "Its over."o Other tweets by this juror referenced how
"the coffee suck[ed]" and how many days he had spent at trial."'
The court did not discuss any First Amendment right of the juror,
but based its holding on the fact that the juror admitted to
tweeting.172 It held that this proved that the juror did not follow the
court's instructions, which in turn prejudiced the defendant.' 3 The
court explained that:
[T]his court has recognized the importance that
jurors not be allowed to post musings, thoughts,
or any other information about trials on any
online forums. The possibility for prejudice is
simply too high. Such a fact is underscored in
this case, as Appellant points out, because one
of the juror's Twitter followers was a reporter.
Thus, the media had advance notice that the
jury had completed its sentencing deliberations
before an official announcement was made to
the court. This is simply unacceptable, and the
circuit court's failure to acknowledge this
juror's inability to follow the court's directions
was an abuse of discretion.17 4
The court emphasized the fact that it was the juror's inability to be
discreet about the case and follow directions that was problematic
and increased the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant,
therefore the circuit court erred in denying the motion for
mistrial.'75
168. Id.
169. Id. at 247.
170. Dimas-Martinez, 385 S.W.3d at 257.
171. Nuss, supra note 163.




618 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
176
In furor Number One v. Superior Court, the juror sat on a
criminal trial in which the defendants were convicted of offenses for
brutally beating a man. 77 The juror posted on Facebook about the
evidence that was presented at trial and invited his Facebook
friends to comment.'78 The juror deleted some of his posts,
though.'79 The trial court wanted to use the Stored Communications
Act (SCA)'80 to force the juror to consent to authorize Facebook to
release all items he posted during the trial, since Facebook would
not disclose this information without such consent.' 1 The juror filed
a petition for a writ of prohibition and the Third District of the
California Court of Appeals ruled that the juror failed to establish
that the trial court exceeded its power to inquire into the alleged
juror misconduct. 82 The court stated "even if Juror Number One
has a privacy interest in his Facebook posts, that interest is not
absolute. It must be balanced against the rights of real parties in
interest to a fair trial, which rights may be implicated by juror
misconduct."'8 3 The court found that there was a presumption of
prejudice because the juror violated the jury instructions.'
Because the court did not have access to all of the juror's posts, it
could not rule that there was "no substantial likelihood" that the
juror had a bias against the defendants, and thus denied the juror's
petition for writ of prohibition.'85
176. 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
177. Id. at 153.
178. Id. at 154.
179. Id.
180. The Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711) prevents
the government from forcing Internet service providers to give customer
information and limits them from voluntarily giving up that information. See
Orin S. Kerr, A Use's' Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislators' Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1212-13
(2004). There is a consent exception under 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3), which is
what the trial court attempted to utilize. Juror No. One, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
153.
181. Juror No.One, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 153.
182. Id. at 162.
183. Id. at 159.
184. Id. at 163 (Mauro, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 162. See also id. at 166 (Mauro, J., concurring).
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Surprisingly, even attorneys who serve as jurors have
affected the verdict of the trial on which they sat due to their own
improper social network usage.86 An attorney in San Diego, who
was serving as a juror on a felony criminal matter, posted on a blog
during the proceedings.'8 His post stated:
[T]oday I was impaneled along with 12 others
from the voter rolls of San Diego County in a
felony theft and burglary trial in Department
37 of the old downtown courthouse, in the
courtroom of the Honorable Laura Palmer
Hammes, a stern, attentive woman with thin
red hair and long, spidery fingers that as a
grandkid you probably wouldn't want snapped
at you. Nowhere do I recall the jury
instructions mandating I can't post comments
in my blog about the trial. (Ha. Sorry, will do.)
So, being careful to not prejudice the rights of
the defendant-a stout, unhappy man by the first
name of Donald. . .188
The State Bar Court of California found that because the juror
identified the name of the presiding judge, the first name of the
defendant, and the specific crimes the defendant was charged with,
he violated both the rules governing juror duties as well as the
California Business and Professions Code.189 Furthermore, an
appellate court set aside the verdict and the case was sent back to a
lower court "for further proceedings consistent with the Court of
Appeal's decision." 90
186. See Frank R. Wilson, No. 06-0-12019, at 7-12 (State Bar of Cal.
January 23, 2009), available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-0-
13019-1.pdf. See also John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules
of Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at Al.
187. Frank R. Wilson, No. 06-0-12019, at 10 (State Bar of Cal. January
23, 2009), available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDoes/06-0-13019-
L.pdf.
188 See id.
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id. at 2.
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This type of misconduct often occurs before a verdict is
reached, allowing judges to remedy the problem before having to
go to the extreme of granting a new trial.'9' In Michigan, a juror
posted on Facebook about her belief of the defendant's guilt before
the jury had reached a verdict.192 Her post stated she was: "actually
excited for jury duty tomorrow . . . it's gonna be fun to tell the
defendant they're guilty."'93 Because she disobeyed the judge by
failing to follow the jury instructions and disregarding the oath, the
juror was replaced with an alternate and fined for her actions.194
2. Denials of Motions for Mistrials and Overturning Verdicts
Although there have been instances where the verdict was
overturned or a mistrial was declared because of a juror's conduct
on social networks, some cases have not resulted in the same
outcome.' In People v. Ortiz,"9 the defendant was convicted of
first-degree murder.'9 7 A juror kept a blog about the stages of the
trial.'9" The court took an objective view of the blog entries and
stated:
Although Juror W. indisputably discussed the
case while the matter was pending in violation
of the court's admonition, and thereby
committed misconduct, none of the discussions
were directed at appellant or the substance of
the case against him . . . . Juror W. never
191. See Martha Nell, Oops. Juror Calls Defendant Guilty on Facebook,






195. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2011); People v,
Ortiz, No. B205674, 2009 WL 3211030, at * 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009)
(unpublished); Commonwealth v. Werner, 967 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. App. Ct.
2012).
196. No. B205674, 2009 WL 3211030, (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009).
197. Id. at *1
198. Id. at *4.
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mentions appellant by name, nor does he refer
to any of the factual allegations, evidence, or
legal defenses at issue in the case. The entries
are also devoid of any indication that Juror W.
had prejudged the case, relied on extraneous
materials, or based his verdict on anything
other than the evidence and instructions
presented at trial. Any stated "cynicism" or
"lack of respect" for the legal system in general
was not the basis for the finding of misconduct
because Juror W. was not admonished to
refrain from engaging in that type of
discussion.'"
The entries contained no evidence that suggested prejudice,
reliance on outside information, or that anything besides what was
presented at trial was used in reaching a decision.200 Although the
court concluded that there was misconduct because the juror
discussed the case despite the court's warning, it held that this did
not rise to the level of misconduct that calls for granting a new trial
because the juror's entries were not substantively about the case
and did not evidence any prejudice.2 0 1
During the federal corruption trial of former Pennsylvania
Senator Vincent Fumo, the judge took a similar approach to the
court in Ortiz.202 Fumo was charged with several counts of fraud,
tax evasion, and obstruction of justice regarding his activities while
holding public office. 203 Throughout the jury selection and the
actual trial, a juror posted the following comments on his Facebook
wall:
Sept. 18: (apparently upon a continuance of the
trial due to judge's illness): "[Juror 1] is glad he
got a 5 week reprieve, but still could use the
money..."
199. Id. at *6.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See United States v. Furno, 655 F.3d 288, 304-06 (3d Cir. 2011).
203. Id. at 294.
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- Jan. 11: (apparently referring to the end of
the government's case): "[Juror 1] is wondering
if this could be the week to end Part 1?"
- Jan. 21: "[Juror 1] wonders if today will
really be the end of Part 1? ? ?"
- Mar. 4: (conclusion of closing arguments):
"[Juror 1] can't believe tomorrow may actually
be the end!!!"
- Mar. 8: (Sunday evening before second day
of deliberations): "[Juror 1] is not sure about
tomorrow..."
- Mar. 9: (end of second day of deliberations):
"[Juror 1] says today was much better than
expected and tomorrow looks promising too!"
- Mar. 13: (Friday after completion of first
week of deliberations): "Stay tuned for the big
announcement on Monday everyone!",2
The juror also posted a message on Twitter-
which gained media attention -stating: "This is
it . . .no looking back now!" 205
In determining whether these statements constituted sufficient
grounds for granting a new trial, the court analyzed whether the
juror's posts substantially prejudiced the defendant. 20 The court
reasoned that the juror's tweet that said "This is it . . . no looking
back now" was vague and unclear, suggesting that the case was
already decided, which would not have a negative impact on the
trial.207 Thus, because the juror's general status updates on
Facebook did not reveal information that appeared to prejudice the
defendant, let alone "substantially prejudice" him, the court denied
defendant's motion for a mistrial.208
Even in circumstances where the juror is clearly speaking
about the trial or jury duty, some courts have refused to find that
204. Id. at 298.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 304.
207. Id. at 306.
208. Id. at 305-06.
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the postings have impacted the juror's ability to be impartial.209 In
the well-covered Chandra Levy murder trial, a potential juror
posted the following during the jury selection process for the
upcoming trial: "Guilty. Guilty. I say no. I will not be swayed.
Practicing for jury duty."21 0 After questioning by the judge in
chambers, however, the juror was allowed to remain in the selection
211process.
In Commonwealth v. Werner,2 12 the defendant was convicted
of twelve counts of larceny.213 After the verdicts were returned, the
defense attorney looked up the Facebook profiles of jury
members,214 finding that two jurors had open profiles (accessible to
the public Facebook community) and had made posts during the
21trial2. One juror posted: "[I] had jury duty today and was selected
for the jury . . . . Bleh! Stupid jury duty!"21 6 This juror received
three responses, one of which stated: "Throw the book at 'em." 217
The other juror's Facebook page showed the following interaction:
"Waiting to be selected for jury duty. I don't
feel impartial." A person responded, "Tell
them 'BOY HOWDIE, I KNOW THEM
GUILTY ONES!" Later that day at 4:54 P.M.,
[this juror] posted again: "Superior Court in
Brockton picks me . . for the trail [sic ]. The[y]
tell us the case could go at least 1 week. OUCH
209. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Werner, 967 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. App.
Ct.. 2012); Keith L. Alexander & Henri E. Cauvin, Jury Set for Levy Murder
Trial; One Man Gets Heat Over Tweet, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/22/AR2010102
207109.html?wprss=rssmetro.
210. Alexander & Cauvin, supra note 209.
211. Id. The conversation between the judge and juror was inaudible to
those in the courtroom. Even though the judge allowed the juror to remain in
the selection process, the juror was not chosen as one of the sixteen to serve
during the trial. Id.
212. 967 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
213. Id. at 159.





OUCH OUCH." [The juror]'s wife replied to
this at 9:37 P.M., "Nothing like sticking it to the
jury confidentiality clause on Facebook . . . .
Anyway, just send her to Framingham quickly
so you can be home for dinner on time." Later
that evening, another of his friends responded:
"I'm with [juror's wife] ... tell them that you
asked all your F[ace] B[ook] friends and they
think GUILTY."21 8
The court found that the postings "revealed no evidence of
extraneous influences on the jury," that "there was overwhelming
evidence of [the defendant's] guilt," and that the jurors "had not
been exposed to any extraneous information in any other postings
or responses." 2 19 The court then held that it was in the trial judge's
discretion to deny the motion for a new trial.220
These cases illustrate how the impact of juror misconduct
on a legal proceeding differs among jurisdictions. There is a lack of
uniformity in decisions-even in those with similar facts. As
evidenced above, even in murder cases where the postings are
vague, the misconduct can affect the case in different ways
depending on the court and the judge. These types of decisions may
give one defendant a second chance while another defendant, in the
exact same predicament, does not get that chance.
V. METHODS TO ADDRESS SOCIAL-MEDIA RELATED
JUROR MISCONDUCT
There are many proposed methods by which courts can
limit jury misconduct. No method is perfect-each has benefits and
consequences -but the goal should be to choose the most efficient
and effective method that balances both the rights conferred by the
First and Sixth Amendments. The following will discuss a few
possible solutions and then Section VI will explain a possible
218. Id.
219. Id. at 167.
220. Id.
2013] JURIES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 625
solution that balances both the First Amendment rights of jurors
and Sixth Amendment rights of defendants.22
A. Limiting Forms of Communication
A more extreme method of preventing juror misconduct is
to require the jurors to deactivate all social networks during the
trial, which would prohibit the use of them even outside of the
222courthouse. This option is the most extreme suggestion and has
not been implemented by courts.223 If such a restriction were put
into effect, there would undoubtedly be claims that the restriction is
not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of protecting a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right and is therefore
unconstitutional because less restrictive means could be
224implemented. Courts have, however, taken steps towards limiting
communication.225
Courts have thus limited communication without
completely prohibiting it.226 Jurors in Michigan are allowed to use
their cell phones and other electronics only during scheduled
breaks.227 New Jersey has a similar rule.2" Some courts take away
electronics altogether, but these rules do not extend outside of the
courthouse.229
221. Other possible solutions that are common but are not discussed in
full detail in this Note, include: implementing a modified preliminary jury
instruction that encompasses Internet usage; enhancing juror education on the
issues social network usage poses; juror sequestration; elimination of
"problem jurors" through voir dire; punishment/penalties in conjunction with
holding the jury responsible as a unit; and allowing questions, which in turn
gives the jury a more active role. See Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 436-53;
Zora, supra note 150, at 590-601.
222. Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 441.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 224 (listing options that could be less restrictive).
225. See Bell, supra note 135, at 86-88; see also McGee, supra note 47, at
304.
226. See Bell, supra note 135, at 86-88.
227. McGee, supra note 47, at 315.
228. Id. at 315-16.
229. See Bell, supra note 135, at 87; McGee, supra note 47, at 315; Zora,
supra note 150, at 594-95.
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Some jurisdictions warn against certain social network
usage in their jury instructions.23 0 New York's pattern jury
instructions, for example, advise the judge to recite:
In this age of instant electronic communication
and research, I want to emphasize that in
addition to not conversing face to face with
anyone about the case, you must not
communicate with anyone about the case by
any other means, including by telephone, text
messages, email, Internet chat or chat rooms,
blogs, or social websites, such as Facebook,
MySpace or Twitter.23 1
These pattern instructions inform the jurors not to discuss the case
with anyone via any means (whether verbally or social network)
because doing so could jeopardize a fair trial and that there will be
232serious legal consequences if these instructions are not followed.
Limiting the main medium for juror misconduct through
social media (access to the website itself) seems like a highly
effective solution. But the consequences of such an action may
actually outweigh the benefits. One problem is the reaction of the
juror. People may not like to feel as if they are being controlled,
and taking away a person's means of communication may cause
them to react in ways that would be detrimental to the outcome of
the case or perhaps even the function of the court. There are also
people who may tend to perform an act just because they were told
not to. So by telling jurors not to use their cell phones or other
electronic devices with access to social networks, the court may
actually be encouraging more use, or may even be putting the idea
into their heads for the first time.
Another problem arises when one takes into consideration
the extent of enforcing such limitations. There must be
230. Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 451-58.
231. See COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION, OFFICE OF COURT
ADMIN., CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D: JURY ADMONITIONS IN
PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS (2009), N.Y.COURTS.Gov, available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cjill-General/CJI2d.Jury
Admonitions.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
232. Id.
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determinations of who will check to make sure that the restrictions
are being adhered to, how extensive that check should be, and what
the consequences are when it is discovered that a juror violated the
instructions. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to limit the use
of these electronics outside of the courthouse, so implementation of
233such restrictions may only go as far as the courthouse door.
B. Elimination of Potentially Problematic Jurors Through Pre-
Trial Investigation
Courts already employ voir dire, which is designed to
determine whether a potential juror is capable of being impartial.2 34
Even with this process, though, it still seems as if more investigation
231into a potential juror is necessary. With frequent and common
use of the Internet, almost anyone can perform a basic search on a
236
person. Through investigating potential jurors, one can find
whether that person is likely to partake in misconduct involving
social media by viewing the type of things they normally post or
how often they post. If a potential juror is one that constantly posts
about other people or every detail of his or her own life (like
keeping an up-to-date blog), it may be likely that that person will
post about the trial in that same manner. Also, through online
investigation, it may be possible to discover whether a person lied
in answering any question during voir dire that would show
impartiality or that that person is unfit to serve as a juror.23 it
would be better to discover this information before the trial begins
rather than after a verdict is already reached so as to possibly
prevent wasting the time and resources of those involved with a
trial.
Problems with this type of investigation are similar to those
that arise when limiting communication. First, it would need to be
233. See Goldstein, supra note 109, at 599-600.
234. McGee, supra note 47, at 317-18.
235. See id.
236. Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 443.
237. See id. at 443. This all assumes that a juror has an open profile. Any
Fourth Amendment or privacy interests of the juror that may be involved with
these searches are outside the scope of this Note.
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determined who will conduct the investigation.m If the attorneys
conduct the investigations, there is a risk that they may not reveal
their findings if they find that a potential juror is advantageous to
their client.239
Depending on who is investigating, some inquiries may be
more extensive than others, which may cause certain predictors of
misconduct to go undetected.24 Some of these investigations may
also prove to be time consuming and require extra resources, which
in turn may reduce the efficiency of the judicial process.24 ' Also,
242there must be a determination of the scope of the investigations.
One issue these investigations raise is that they may start to cross
the line into infringing privacy rights. 243 By looking online for
information about potential jurors, they may feel as if these
searches invade their private lives.
VI. HOW TO BALANCE JURORS' FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS WITH CITIZENS' SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
AN IMPARTIAL JURY
The methods listed above, along with many other proposed
methods24S to deal with the problem of juror misconduct and social
media, hardly mention the First Amendment rights of jurors,
seeming to indicate that protecting a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right is more important than protecting a juror's First Amendment
238. Id. at 444-45 (discussing the concern that attorneys may not reveal
the misconduct that they have discovered in their investigations).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 444.
241. Bell, supra note 135, at 87-88 (stating that certain voir dire
questions may "substantially shrink the pool of eligible jurors," which would
"threaten the idea that juries should derive from a fair cross-section of the
community").
242. Id.
243. Id. Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 444 (stating how Judge Richard
Posner noted that "[mjost people dread jury duty-partly because of privacy
concerns" (quoting United States v. Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir.
2010) (Posner, J. dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc))).
244. Id.
245. See supra note 224 (listing other possible methods).
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246
right. It is important that the accused have a fair trial and an
impartial jury; however, do the rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment trump those guaranteed by the First Amendment?2 47
Take the earlier mentioned Arkansas Supreme Court case
for example, in which the court ordered a new trial because of a
tweet that stated: "Choices to be made. Hearts to be broken ... We
each define the great line."248 It is not necessarily certain that the
juror that tweeted this was not speaking of an occurrence that
happened in his own household.2 49 Though this is not probable, it is
certainly possible. Cases that present this type of ambiguity raise
several questions: how does one differentiate between what relates
to a trial and what may be just a post that relates to the juror's
home life?25 0 If a juror is speaking of the judicial process as a whole,
how should a determination be made as to whether that is
acceptable? 25' How does one decide the repercussions or even
penalty for the juror if the post is an obscure one?25 2 Though
freedom of speech is not absolute, it is important to find an optimal
solution that takes into consideration all interests at stake; it is thus
necessary to find a way to regulate juror speech in a manner that
protects both the juror's First Amendment right and the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right.253
In order to find an appropriate solution, it is important to
remember why exactly jurors' use of social media has been
problematic-because it has sometimes been shown to affect a
juror's ability to be impartial. 54 There are several main objectives
in ensuring an impartial jury: courts want to make sure that they are
limiting information that jurors use to reach a verdict to what is
246. Strauss, supra note 7, at 389.
247. Id.
248. Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 246 (Ark. 2011).
249. See id. at 246-47 (referencing the juror's answer as to what he meant
by the tweet when he posted it).
250. Id.
251. See supra notes 82, 93 and accompanying text.
252. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2011)
(discussing why a Facebook post was considered to be vague).
253. Strauss, supra note 7, at 408.
254. See supra Part II (exploring the meaning and origins of the Sixth
Amendment).
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presented in trial; courts want jurors to be free from outside
influences; and courts want to discover anything that serves as
proof that a juror is biased.255 Knowing these major concerns allows
for a proper molding of an adequate solution. 6
With the aforementioned objectives in mind, a preferable
solution is an approach that classifies the types of misconduct and
allows judges to respond accordingly. This approach would allow
jurors to continue to have protected speech (particularly when the
speech is not prejudicial on its face) as well as ensure that
defendants are not being blatantly prejudiced (particularly when
the speech is prejudicial on its face) because it allows the
application of different standards for each category.
A. Category 1: When Speech is Specifically and Identifiably
About The Case and Receives Less First Amendment
Protection
The first category includes social network interactions that
are specifically about the case on which the juror is sitting. This
category would include any activity that is patently obvious that it is
about the case and given the information included, it would enable
a reasonable person to be able to identify the case. These activities
would include any information that is directly related to the
defendant in the case, such as the defendant's name, statements
about evidence presented at trial, comments about deciding factors
in jury deliberation, comments that directly show that the juror is
partial, anything that solicits outside influences such as asking for
opinions or information, and activities of the like. This type of
information is basically substantive information. The first category
of juror misconduct is when the free speech of jurors is least
protected.25 7
255. Supra Part IV (discussing the jury, the use of social media, and its
impact on trials).
256. Strauss, supra note 7, at 408-09.
257. It is important that restrictions in this category, however, are not
"content-based restrictions" because if so, any restriction would have to pass
strict scrutiny. For content-based restrictions (restrictions based on the subject
matter of the speech), "strict scrutiny" is generally applied. The restriction will
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When information of this type is divulged, there should be a
218
presumption of material prejudice. Once a moving party proves
that such information has been disclosed by the juror, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to prove that "there exists no
'reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was [or will be]
influenced by an improper communication."' 25 9 In ruling on the
matter, the judge should then be governed by the "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard. 26) Because these types of
activities tend to generate outside influences and are the strongest
evidence of potential biases, they should be governed by a standard
geared towards protecting a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury. By creating a presumption of prejudice from this
type of speech, the non-movant would have to show that the
defendant's right to an impartial jury was not impinged, therefore
affording more protection to the defendant.
B. Category 2: When Speech is Not About The Case, But About
The Process and Receives More First Amendment Protection
In this category are social network interactions that are not
specifically about the case on which the juror is sitting, but may be
about surrounding circumstances261 - where it is not patently
obvious that the speech is about the case itself.2 62 Such activity
would include discussions of the procedural aspects of participating
as a juror such as comments about the judicial process or general
feelings towards the judges or judicial system, discussion of the
be upheld only if it is necessary "to promote a compelling interest," and is "the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." See Sable Commc'ns
of Ca., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
258. Supra Part III (discussing jury misconduct and the First Amendment
rights of jurors).
259. United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Stephens v. S. Atl. Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1988)).
260. Supra Part III (discussing jury misconduct and the First Amendment
rights of jurors).
261. See Chemerinsky, supra note 81, at 862-67 (making the argument
that attorney speech about cases and the judicial process should be viewed as
political speech, which would be protected by the First Amendment).
262. Id. at 863.
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feeling of serving as a juror, endorsing or defending their decision,
and activities of the like.2 This category should also include vague
references that do not solicit extraneous influences. 264 This type of
speech can be categorized as political speech 26 based on the notion
that the judicial process is considered a public issue and is thus
important to public debate. 2 66 The second category of juror
misconduct is when the free speech of jurors is most protected.
Like political speech, attempts to restrict these activities
should be governed by strict scrutiny.267 So, in order for a new trial
to be granted, judges should be guided by determining whether the
government has a compelling interest in restricting that speech and
that the regulation is narrowly tailored "to achiev[ing] [that]
compelling purpose."268 In most cases, the compelling purpose will
be the need to ensure a fair trial through an impartial jury. This
justification would not necessarily be adequate in situations
concerning the speech in this category, unless there is concrete
evidence that the speech jeopardizes the opportunity for a fair trial.
The burden here would be on the movant, thereby affording more
protection to the speech of the juror.
By implementing this categorical approach, courts should be
able to place factual situations into a category and provide
remedies. When the speech is more prejudicial to the defendant on
its face-category 1-a presumption of prejudice puts the burden
on the non-movant to prove that prejudice doesn't exist. When the
speech is least prejudicial to the defendant on its face-category
2-strict scrutiny is applied without a presumption of prejudice.
This places the burden on the movant to create an argument that
263. Id. at 863-64.
264. Id. at 864.
265. Id. at 863.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 862.
268. Id. at 881.
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illuminates why restricting the speech in that instance is narrowly
tailored to "to achiev[ing] a compelling purpose."269
Thus under these guidelines, the Facebook posts that were
questioned in Commonwealth v. Werner270 would be placed in the
first category. Facially, the posts directly suggested the possibility
that the juror was not able to be impartial because he stated, "I
don't feel impartial" and also had friends commenting as to the
defendant's guilt and making statements such as "[t]hrow the book
at 'em." 271 There should be a presumption of prejudice and then the
government would have to show that the defendant's right to an
impartial jury was not impinged.
Conversely, the tweet that read: "Choices to be made.
Hearts to be broken . . . . We each define the great line" would be
272
placed in the second category. On its face, it does not directly
discuss the case, does not solicit outside information, and does not
directly show any prejudice. More evidence should be required to
prove that such a tweet actually jeopardized defendant's right to a
fair trial and this tweet should therefore be placed in category 2,
where strict scrutiny would be used instead of the substantial
likelihood of material prejudice standard used in the actual case.273
Once the court gets into the habit of providing consistent
remedial measures, decisions about what measure to take will be
easier because there will already be precedent. There will be more
uniformity and more foreseeability in the outcomes rather than
what seems like inconsistency on how juror misconduct will impact
a trial.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
271. Id.
272. See Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 246 (Ark. 2011).
273. Id. at 248.
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CONCLUSION
Courts have observed that "there are no perfect trials,"274
but it is necessary to strive towards perfection by providing a
method that aims at resolving the problems highlighted in this
Note. Although there have been some steps toward remedying the
problems that juror use of social media has posed, there needs to be
more uniformity among courts in the handling of such solutions.
Clarity needs to be brought to the rules that restrict disclosure by
jurors and there needs to be consistent application imposed with
regards to the penalties for misconduct. Furthermore, the solution
must not give complete weight to the Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial trial of the accused, but should balance that right with
jurors' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the values
it provides.
274. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553
(1984) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-232 (1973))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
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